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Abstract—The abundance of rich varieties of data is enabling
many transformative applications of big data analytics that have
profound societal impacts. However, there are also increasing
concerns regarding the improper use of individual users’ private
data. Many argue that the technology that customizes our
experience in the cyber domain is threatening the fundamental
civil right to privacy.
In this paper, we propose PrivacyGuard, a system that
leverages smart contract in blockchain and trusted execution
environment to enable individuals’ control over other parties’
access and use of their private data. In our design, smart
contracts are used to specify data usage policy (i.e. who can use
what data under which conditions along with how the data can be
used), while the distributed ledger is used to keep an irreversible
and non-repudiable record of data usage. To address the contract
execution efficiency problem, as well as to prevent exposing user
data on the publicly viewable blockchain, we construct a novel
off-chain contract execution engine which realizes trustworthy
contract execution off-chain in an trusted execution environment
(TEE). By running the contract program inside a hardware-
assisted TEE, the proposed off-chain trustworthy contract exe-
cution improves system efficiency significantly, as its correctness
does not rely on distributed consensus which essentially requires
the contract program be executed on all miner nodes. In order to
leverage TEE in off-chain execution, PrivacyGuard has to several
technical challenges such as synchronous function completion
and scalability mitigation in blockchain platform. We build and
deploy a prototype of PrivacyGuard using Ethereum and Intel
SGX, and our experiments demonstrate the feasibility to support
data-intensive applications using data from a large number of
users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent emergence of big data analytics and artificial in-
telligence has made life-impacting changes in many sectors of
society. For example, deep-learning trained physical assistant
has demonstrate higher accuracy in pneumonia diagnosis than
expert radiologists working alone [1]. One of the fundamental
enabling components for the recent advancements in artificial
intelligence is the abundance of data. However, as more and
more information on individuals is collected, shared, and
analyzed, there is an increasing concern on the privacy impli-
cation. In the 2018 Facebook-Cambridge Analytica incident,
an API, originally designed to allow a third party app to access
the personality profile of participating users, was misused by
Cambridge Analytica to collect information on 50 million
of Facebook profiles without the consent of the users [2].
These illicit harvested private data are later used to create
personalized psychology profiles for political purposes [2].
With increasing exposure on the privacy risks of big data,
many now consider the involuntary collection of personal
information a step backward in fundamental civil right of
privacy, or even in humanity [3], [4]. Yet, driven by economic
force, the collection and analysis of the personal data continue
to grow at an amazing pace.
Individuals share personal information with people or orga-
nizations within a particular community for specific purposes;
this is often referred to as the context of privacy [5]. For exam-
ple, individuals may share their medical status with healthcare
professionals, product preferences with retailers, and real-time
whereabouts with their loved ones. When information shared
within one context is exposed in another unintended one,
people may feel a sense of privacy violation [6]. The pur-
poses and values of those contexts are also undermined. The
contextual nature of privacy implies that privacy protection
techniques need to address at least two aspects: 1) what kind of
information can be exposed to whom, under what conditions;
and 2) what is the “intended purpose” or “expected use” of
this information. Much research has been done to address
the first privacy aspect, focusing on data access control [7],
[8], [9], [10] and data anonymization [11], [12], [13], [14].
Only recently, there have been a few works that attempted
to address the second aspect of privacy from the architecture
perspective [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. In fact, many
people used to believe that the prevention of this kind of
“second-hand” data (mis)use can only be enforced by legal
methods [21]. With the current practice, once an authorized
user gains access to the data, there is little control over how
this user would use the data. Whether or not he/she would use
the data for purposes not consented by the user, or pass the
data to another party (i.e., data monetization) is entirely up to
this new ”data owner”, and is no longer enforceable by the
original data owner.
In this paper, we propose PrivacyGuard to address this very
challenging privacy problem—how to empower individual
users with full control of the use of his/her personal data.
The data owner should not only be able to control who can
have what access to his/her data, but also be ensured that the
data are used only for the intended purposes. To realize the
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envisioned functionality of PrivacyGuard, there are three key
requirements. First, users should be able to define their own
data access policy in terms of to whom they will share the data,
at what price, and for what purpose. Second, data usage should
be recorded in a platform that offers non-repudiation [22].
Third, actual use of user data should have a verifiable proof
that it is compliant to the policy defined by the user.
Blockchain, the technology behind Bitcoin [23] and
Ethereum [24], has emerged as a popular technology in recent
years. To provide these security services, smart contract on
blockchain platform is adapted in PrivacyGuard. The dis-
tributed ledger enabled by distributed consensus in blockchain
has the unique time-stamped property that is non-repudiable
once recorded. Smart contract is a program that runs on the
blockchain and has its correct execution enforced by the con-
sensus protocol. PrivacyGuard leverages the distributed ledger
to provide transparent and tamper-proof recording of data
usage. Furthermore, smart contract is adopted in PrivacyGuard
to enable individual users to control their data access and use,
by establishing a data usage contract between the users and
potential data consumers.
While smart contract and blockchain appear to be the perfect
solution logically, there are fundamental limitations if we
directly apply those technologies to implement the proposed
framework. First of all, data used by smart contracts have to be
on the blockchain and recorded as a transaction. Yet, Bitcoin
network produces one block with size of 1 MB every ten min-
utes [23]. Furthermore, the transaction capacity is not the only
forbidden factor. Smart contracts are small programs that have
to be executed by all participants in the network, which raises
serious efficiency concern. Platforms such as Ethereum [24]
often require payment in the form of gas for executing a smart
contract that is metered based on the complexity of the invoked
function. This implies that executing a large, complex data
analytics program as a smart contract will not only be a waste
of energy for the network but also economically infeasible.
Last but not least, data used by smart contracts are available to
every participant on blockchain by design. If user’s private data
are used directly in smart contract, existing secure computation
techniques to preserve confidentiality and utility of data, such
as functional encryption [25], can be prohibitively expensive
for the network.
To tackle data and computation scalability problems, we
build on the intuition that blockchain is a powerful primitive
to enable users to transact based on mutually agreed con-
tracts, but not a platform for heavy computation on large
volumne of data. PrivacyGuard splits the private data use
enforcement problem into two domains: the control plane and
the data plane. Individuals publish the availability as well
as the use policy of their private data as smart contracts
on Blockchain, which is part of the control plane in the
PrivacyGuard system. The policy can include authorized users,
intended computation, triggering condition, as well the price,
etc. Data consumers interact with the smart contract to obtain
authorization to use the data. However, the actual data of the
users are never exposed on the blockchain. Instead, they are
stored in the Cloud in the encrypted form. The computation
on those private user data as well as the provision of secrets
are accomplished off-chain in the data plane using a trusted
execution environment [26], [27] on the Cloud.
When a data contract is split into control and computation,
where the computation actually takes place off-chain, there
are several challenges that need to be addressed. First, the
correctness of the contract execution can no longer be guaran-
teed by the consensus of the network. To this end, we propose
”local consensus” using remote attestation among contracting
parties. Second, the execution of contract is no longer atomic
when the computation slice is executed off-chain. We design
a multi-step commitment protocol to ensure that result release
and data transaction remain an atomic operation, where if the
computation results were tampered with, the data transaction
would abort gracefully. Lastly, using a secure container, private
data are protected inside the trusted execution environment and
secrets are only provisioned when approved according to the
contract binding.
Finally, contract execution is not the only limiting factor.
Even when the decentralized blockchain platform is used in
the control plane, the current transaction rate remains too low
to accommodate studies that involve data from millions of
users. To that end, we propose data broker, to which individual
data owners can delegate the control of their data. Individual
data owners’ trust on the data broker can be bootstrapped by
remote attestation on the data broker system and examination
of broker smart contract. To reduce the transaction volume on
the main chain, data broker records individual data uses in
off-chain storage backed by recorded hash value in the main
chain. Second-level chain or payment channel can then be
used to distribute the reward back to individual users. The
delegation system offers the trade-off between decentralization
and performance without degrading trust, as we move towards
highly scalable blockchain solutions.
We implemented a prototype of PrivacyGuard using Intel
SGX as the trusted execution environment and Ethereum as
the smart contract platform. We chose these two technologies
for implementation due to their wide adoption. Our design
generally applies to other types of trusted execution environ-
ments and blockchain platforms. We show that it is possible
to enable large complex data computations automatically with
the security protection as specified by the smart contract.
Furthermore, we also analyze the security of the system and
share our empirical measurement of the platform.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We propose PrivacyGuard, a framework for trustworthy
private data computation and data usage tracking that
aims to address one of the most pressing problems in big
data analytics—private data usage control. PrivacyGuard
builds on latest advancements in trustworthy computing
and decentralized platforms. PrivacyGuard is an open
platform that allows any user to contribute his/her data
into the ecosystem, and allows the user to specify the
context under which his/her data can be used, i.e. what
the data can be used for, when it can be used, where it
can be used, and by whom it can be used.
• We propose a novel construction of off-chain contract
execution engine to support the vision of PrivacyGuard.
The proposed off-chain trustworthy contract execution
is the key to improve the execution efficiency of smart
contract technology, enabling trustworthy execution of
more complex contract program without solely relying
on costly network consensus. Private data computation
in PrivacyGuard is split into the control plane and data
plane. The control plane on blockchain provides high-
level data exchange negotiation and control, while com-
putationally expensive tasks are off-loaded to trusted
environments for confidential data processing in the data
plane. Remote attestation is used to create local consensus
among the contract parties.
• We implemented a prototype of PrivacyGuard using Intel
SGX and Ethereum smart contract. Our evaluation of the
system shows that PrivacyGuard is capable of process-
ing large volumes of data without incurring significant
overhead.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Blockchain and Smart Contract
Blockchain is a recently emerged technology used in popu-
lar cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [23] and Ethereum [24]. It
enables a wide range of distributed applications as a powerful
primitive. With a blockchain in place, applications that could
previously run only through a trusted intermediary can now
operate in a fully decentralized fashion without the need for
a central authority, and achieve the same functionality with
comparable realibiity. When the majority of the nodes in the
network follow the protocol honestly, the shared blockchain
becomes an authenticated and timestamped record of the net-
work’s activities. The conceptual idea of programmable elec-
tronic “smart contracts” dates back nearly twenty years [28].
When implemented in the blockchain platform, smart contracts
are account-holding objects that can receive transfers, make
decisions, store data or even interact with other contracts.
Due to its ability to enable various forms of business logic,
smart contract has become a newly-emerged killer application
of blockchain technology. Ethereum is among the firsts to
offer a Turing-complete decentralized smart contract platform.
The blockchain and the smart contract platform however have
several drawbacks in transaction capacity [29], computation
cost [30], [31], as well as privacy of user and data [32], [31].
B. Trusted Execution Environment
Creating vulnerability-free software has long been con-
sidered a very challenging problem [33]. To tackle this
problem, researchers in the architecture community in both
academia [34] and industry [27], [26] have shifted a new
paradigm of limiting the trusted computing base (TCB) to
only the hardware. The Intel SGX is a newly developed
instruction set extension to provide secure execution [26]. Ap-
plications are executed in secure containers, called enclaves.
The hardware guarantees the integrity and confidentiality of
the protected application, even if the privileged software is
compromised. This protection is accomplished by integrating
multiple technologies into processor, such as software attes-
tation and memory encryption. Programs executed within the
enclave are executed as user space programs. Memory of the
enclave is encrypted automatically by the hardware, while I/O
functionalities are supported by the potentially untrusted host
operating system. The Intel SGX has recently been adapted as
a powerful primitive to build secure systems [35], [36], [37],
[30].
III. PRIVACYGUARD OVERVIEW: A FRAMEWORK
ENABLING USER CONTROL ON PRIVATE DATA
The abundance of data has been the catalyst for recent trans-
formative changes to society with the application of artificial
intelligence and machine learning. However, at the same time,
there is an increasing concern on the use/misuse of the data.
PrivacyGuard aims to provide a platform to enable end-to-
end control of data for individual data owners, including all
subsequent use of data after collection.
A. System Goal
1) Confidentiality Protection on User Data: When data
is generated under the current paradigm, it is stored in the
vendor’s cloud storage. Access control on user data generally
relies on the vendor system. This lack of confidentiality
guarantee often discourages individual data sharing among
individual users. User-controlled, rather than service provider-
controlled, encryption/decryption is fundamental for broad
participation in data contribution.
2) User-controlled Fine-grained Verifiable Data Access and
Usage Recording: Under the current paradigm, once the data
is uploaded to the vendor cloud, it belongs to the vendor under
a service agreement. A user might be able to grant or deny
others access to her data. There is, however, no way for the
user to verify who actually accessed her private data, not to
mention the purpose of the access. The lack of transparency
and verifiability on data access often discourages users from
sharing data [38]. A public service that keeps track of user
data usage and makes it auditable by data owners is therefore
essential to not only protecting user privacy but also promoting
data sharing in the community.
3) Enforceable Legal Binding on User Data Usage:
Service-level agreements and legal contracts are often the only
protection a user has for how his/her data is stored, shared,
and used. However, these agreements are often very difficult
to understand, not to mention enforce. A security system that
can capture user-defined privacy policies and then enforce the
compliance of the policy during the execution of the data
access is instrumental in enabling broader data sharing.
B. System Overview
Fig. 1 shows the system architecture of PrivacyGuard.
Although we have been using the term users to refer to both
individuals and organizations, we differentiate two roles that
Fig. 1. System Architecture for PrivacyGuard Framework
an user in the data market can take. We refer to the individual
or organization that owns the data as data owner (DO) and the
entity that needs to access the data as data consumer (DC).
We call the entity trusted by an individual data owner for
data management the iDataAgent. We call the entity that acts
as broker for a collection of users the data broker (DB).
Individual data owners extend their trust to the data broker
via a smart contract along with remote attestation.
Classified by the assigned responsibility, there are three
main components in the PrivacyGuard framework: 1) data
market, 2) iDataAgent and data broker, 3) off-chain contract
execution.
1) Data Market: Essential to PrivacyGuard, data market
is the subsystem that will support the supply, demand and
exchange of data on top of blockchain. For data access control,
a data owner can encode the terms and conditions regarding
the access to his/her personal data in a smart contract, and
publish it on a blockchain platform such as Ethereum [24].
Data usage by DC is recorded via a transaction that interacts
with the data smart contract.
2) iDataAgent and Data Broker: Individual data agent
(iDataAgent) is a trusted program that represents the data
owner. The iDataAgent is responsible for key management
for the user. It also participates in contract execution by only
provisioning the data key material to attested remote entities.
The iDataAgent can be the user’s smart home hub or a trusted
program running in a TEE on the Cloud. Since it is often not
realistic to expect individual data owner to be connected all
the time, iDataAgent can also be a trusted program hosted
by the Cloud platform. To address the inherent transaction
bandwidth of current blockchain implementation, data broker
is introduced to collectively represent a group of users.
3) Trusted Off-chain Contract Execution: This component
executes data operations that were negotiated between the data
owner and data consumer in smart contracts from the control
plane. The off-chain contract execution should also provide
the correctness guarantee as that of on-chain, which turns out
to be quite challenging.
C. PrivacyGuard High-Level Workflow
In what follows we outline the workflow of PrivacyGuard.
The workflow has three stages: 1) data generation, encryption,
and key management, 2) data access policy generation and
contract negotiation, 3) data utilization and contract execution.
1) Data Generation, Encryption, and Key Management:
In this stage, user data are collected and uploaded to the
cloud storage. In PrivacyGuard, user data are generated by
user device and encrypted by iDataAgent, who then passes
the encrypted data to the Cloud for storage. The iDataAgent
program can either be hosted in a trusted Edge node or in a
TEE hosted by the Cloud. Keys used for data encryption are
generated by users via interface to iDataAgent, but they will
be managed by iDataAgent.
2) Policy Generation and Contract Negotiation: In Pri-
vacyGuard, individual owners can define their own access
and usage policies for their private data. The policy that
is encoded in the smart contract on the blockchain usually
includes the essential components for privacy context. For ex-
ample, a policy can contain [data type, data range, operation,
consumer, expiration, cost], where the intended use of data
of certain type, range is encoded as operation, which can be
arbitrary computer programs attestable by iDataAgent. While
this construction provides a mechanism for an individual to
contribute data with fine-grained access and usage policy, the
deployment requires a highly scalable blockchain platform that
can handle millions of transaction per second. To mitigate this
scalability constraint, PrivacyGuard makes use of data broker
as an intermediate surrogate for groups of users.
3) Data Utilization—Contract Execution: Smart contract,
by design, can only embed simple logic operations (functions)
that compute on data on blockchain. However, the intended
use of the data often involves complex computer programs
consuming a vast amount of data. To tackle this challenge,
the smart contract is broken into control segments and data
computation segments. The computation segments are then
executed off-chain, while the control segments remain on the
chain. By executing the data computation off-chain in a TEE
such as Intel SGX, it is possible to not only process a large
volume of off-chain data, but also handle these private user
data confidentially. The correctness of the off-chain execution
is achieved via local consensus by leveraging remote attesta-
tion and trusted computing, where the trust on the contract
execution container is established via attestation.
Therefore, to use the data owner’s private data, the data
consumer will invoke the data owner’s contract for permission
to use and pay the deposit. If the permission is granted on
the blockchain platform, both the data consumer and the data
owner would perform remote attestation on a TEE that loads
the program whose checksum is specified in the contract. The
data owner could either be represented by the iDataAgent or
the data broker. Only when the remote container is successfully
attested, will keys be loaded into the container to enable
decryption and utilization of private data within the TEE.
When the computation finishes, the container will erase all
the associated data and keying materials provisioned to the
container. At the end, the results need to be released to
the data consumer at the same time when cryptocurrency is
transferred to the data owner. To enable this atomic operation
that combines the disconnected data plane and control plane,
we make use of a commitment protocol. More specifically,
the data consumer will invoke the data contract with the
commitment hash after obtaining the encrypted result. The data
transaction will only complete when both data consumer and
data owner agree. The detailed design of off-chain execution
will be described in Section V.
D. Threat Model and Assumptions
The end goal of PrivacyGuard is to provide a methodology
using technology rather than ambiguous legal agreements for
users to understand and control how their data can be used,
and to enable a market of fair and transparent information
exchange. As a result, we assume that the data owners are
honest and trustworthy, while all the other entities act based
on self-interest and may not follow the protocol. However, we
do assume the security system, i.e. the blockchain and TEE
are trustworthy and are free of vulnerability. More specifically,
our model for the control plane and data plane are as follows.
In the control plane, we assume the blockchain infrastruc-
ture is secure that adversaries do not control enough resources
to disrupt distributed consensus. It is also assumed that smart
Fig. 2. Data Market Workflow
contract implementations are free of software vulnerabilities.
Data consumers might attempt to use the data without paying
or leaving a record of use. They may also attempt to perform
operations that are not allowed by the smart contract. We also
assume that the data owner will not attempt to sell falsified
data to the data consumer. There are mechanisms to build
penalize dishonest data owners using smart contracts, but is
out of the scope of this paper.
In the data plane, we assume trusted execution environment
is updated, particularly, Intel SGX, is secure against malicious
attack from the operating system. We recognize that trusted
execution environment is not always perfect [39], [40], [41],
[42], [43], [44], [45], and there has been numerous work
demonstrating side channel information leakage on the SGX
platform alone [39], [40], [43], [44], we believe our design
in this work leverages SGX as a generic trusted execution
environment, and generally applies to other implementation of
the execution environment. Preventing attacks against specific
platform is an important but orthogonal challenge. Further-
more, our work relies on TEE to provide data confidentiality
protection as well as computation integrity, it inherits certain
limitations of TEE while using it as primitive. We also assume
the cloud platform outside the TEE can be compromised, and
collude with either the data consumer or the data owner. All
the communication links are assumed to be secure. We also
assume that there exists a node in the blockchain network
that accepts secure connection for data broker to submit
transactions. However, we do not make any other assumption
on the availability of the network for the TEE.
IV. ENABLING FREE MARKET OF USER-DEFINED ACCESS
TO DATA WITH BLOCKCHAIN
The high level idea of data market is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The intuition behind is to leverage the Blockchain platform
to enable autonomous and transparent data transactions. The
sales of the knowledge extracted from the data are traded
autonomously via smart contracts in our system such that the
data owner obtains the negotiated compensation immediately.
Furthermore, the recording of the data transaction on the
blockchain makes the data use transparent. More specifically,
smart contract detailing how data can be used by data con-
sumers are generated by either individual data owner or data
broker. To search for data availability, data consumers such
as Netflix or Google can parse the data contracts on the
chain. Base on the data availability and operations permitted
at the associated price, they can select the data set for the
study. To start the data operation, data consumer pays a
deposit to the data broker by invoking the data contract.
Instead of completing the data transaction on the blockchain,
the computation is off-loaded to a trusted contract execution
environment (CEE) that is off-chain. At the end of data
computation, CEE releases the result to the data consumer
while completing the data transaction via an on-chain smart
contract invocation.
A. Encoding Data Access Policy with Smart Contract
1) Basic Data Contract: While blockchain and smart con-
tracts are both relatively mature technology, how to make
use of these primitives requires careful considerations, since
different design and implementation of the data policy could
lead to significantly overhead costs. From the data sharing
perspective, a rule in the data access policy often includes
attributes such as type of the data, range or repository of the
data, owner of the data DO and consumer of the data DC.
For example, if a patient X with public key pair (pkX ,skX )
has three types of medical records, radiology record Mr,
blood test record Mb, and psychological mental record Mp,
and he is only willing to share his radiology record and
blood test with urology specialist S with public key pkS ,
he can specify such an access policy P in a data contract
CDA that includes at least the following information: CDA =
{P = {Mr,Mb, pks}, SigskX (P )}. However, the rule above
specifies only access control but not the obligations of the
data consumer once access is granted. The data consumer
could share the data with other parties against the original
intention of the data owner. To enable fine-grained control of
how user data is used, obligations such as allowable function
f can be included in the policy. If patient X only wants
the specialist to run anomaly detection operation Op on the
data, then the new data contract will be CDA = {P =
{Mr,Mb, Op, pks}, SigskX (P )}.
2) Transparent Tracking of Data Consumption: One of the
main objectives is to support trustworthy tracking of data
consumption. To achieve this goal, the system needs to enforce
that only authorized operations in the data usage contract can
be executed, and each data transaction is recorded in a tamper-
resistant storage. In PrivacyGuard, transactions in blockchain
are used to facilitate the recording of data utilization. Since
the ledger is publicly verifiable and unforgeable, data function
invocations encoded in the transactions can provide non-
repudiation on data consumption.
3) Enabling Data Market Economy—Addressing the In-
centive: Data is the source of knowledge for many recent
advances in data mining and artificial intelligence. The own-
ership of data is often considered an asset of great mon-
etary value in modern society. It is therefore important to
provide adequate incentives for both the data owners and
the data consumers to participate in the platform. Through
PrivacyGuard, users can reclaim the ownership of their data
by enforcing who and how other entities can use the pri-
vate data. This ownership requires additional infrastructure
for storage and access control mechanisms, ultimately at an
additional monetary cost. On the other hand, the platform
also encourages more individual users to share their private
data for the greater good and personal benefit without any
concerns regarding privacy leakage or data misuse. Building
on top of the success of cryptocurrency, data owner and data
consumer cannot only transact on the use of data, the platform
can also enable financial purchase for the use of the data.
This can create a vibrant economic sustainable environment
to support the continuous operation of the platform. To add
financial value for data, we further augment our model with
cryptocurrency denoted by $f , and the policy can be defined as
{Mr,Mb, Op, $f, pks}, SigskX (DataUse)}. Using the con-
struction above, data owners can specify a price for data based
on the expected utility of the data as well as its demand.
4) Encoding the Data Contract: The data contract captures
the concepts discussed in earlier in this section, such as
the information that who can access which dataset for what
purpose at what price. The pseudo code of data contract
CDA is shown in Algorithm 1. Let Op be the operation
requested by the data consumer, Dtarget is the data requested
by DC. Additionally, $f denotes the currency a DC deposits
to refund gas expenditure for data use. WDO is the wallet
of DO, and WDC is the wallet of DC. A contract should
have several key functions such as Init, RequestDataUse,
ComputationComplete, and CompleteTransaction, where Init
initializes the policy, RequestDataUse takes a frozen deposit
of amount $f from the DC and proceeds to the next stage
of contract execution. ComputationComplete is used by DC
to signal the completion of an off-chain data operation, and
CompleteTransaction is called by DO to record the data usage
and completes the cryptocurrency transaction. Lastly, Revoke
invalidates the contract and can be called only by DO.
Note that privacy policy writing by itself is a research topic.
Although a relevant topic, it is not the focus of this paper.
Our focus in this paper is the enforcement mechanism. We
use the above-described simple privacy policy to demonstrate
our enforcement mechanism. We envision data consumers who
need to use individual users’ private data can use services
similar to Google Play or Apple App Store to publish their
applications (such as big data analytic app) together with the
applications’ hash values. Individual users can then request
that only the program with the specific hash value, from certain
entity, could execute on their private data, when satisfying
certain conditions. Furthermore, a user can also specify that
his data can only be used if only a certain level of differential
privacy is satisfied, but implementation of the differential
privacy mechanism has to be built into the data analytic
app and become approved but this policy can be enforced.
Ultimately, PrivacyGuard binds the expected behavior of the
data use to the computer program.
Algorithm 1: Data Access and Utilization Smart Contract
CDA for DO
Init: Initialize with policy from DO
parse policy as (pDataset, price, operation, authorizedList) ;
dataSet ← pDataset ;
dataPrice ← price ;
authorizedOperation ← operation ;
authorizedDataConsumer ← authorizedList ;
/* Handling datause request (callable by DC) */
RequestDataUse: Receive the authorization request req
parse req as ($f ,Op,DC,Dtarget) ;
if isAuthorized(Op,DC,Dtarget) then
frozenCashForData ← $f ;
else
terminate ;
/* Atomic result release & commitment */
/* Signaling completion (callable by DC) */
ComputationComplete:
Receive Hash(Kresult) from DC
Save Hash(Kresult) internally ;
/* Recording usage & finish (callable by DO) */
CompleteTransaction: Receive Kresult from DO
if KresultHash = Hash(Kresult) then
send deposit to DO ;
else
exit ;
/* Callable by DC */
Cancel: parse req as (IDtransaction)
if ¬IDtransaction valid then
exit ;
if sender = DB then
cancelTransaction(IDtransaction) ;
else if sender = DC && requestTimeoutFlag = true then
cancelTransaction(IDtransaction) ;
/* Callable by DO */
RevokeContract: if sender = owner then
selfdestruct ;
B. Using Data Broker To Mitigate Scalability Challenge
While the blockchain technology is the core security build-
ing block behind the world’s largest cryptocurrency networks,
it faces a significant scalability barrier in terms of transaction
capacity. For comparison, popular blockchain systems such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum can process an average of 3–20
transactions per second [46], while VISA can handle an
average of 24,000 transactions per second [47]. If Bitcoin
were to replace VISA today, the sheer number of transactions
would bring the blockchain network to a halt. The maximum
rate of transaction processing by blockchain is fundamentally
limited by the choice of the rate of block generation as well
as the size of the block [23], [29]. Increasing the block size
could lead to longer block propagation delays while increasing
the block generation rate could lead to instability (high fork
rate, thus decreased consensus security) in the network [48].
Recognizing this challenge, there have been several proposals
to solve this problem [48], [49], [50], [51]. One of the
promising approaches is the off-chain processing [49], [51],
which aims to shift transactions off the main blockchain by
creating a network of payment channels among individual
parties and only updating the main chain upon consolidation.
However, this technique cannot be directly applied to data
consumption tracking in PrivacyGuard since we want to record
all instances of data usage.
While there are many ongoing efforts to improve the scal-
ability of distributed consensus platform, we take a different
but complementary approach in PrivacyGuard to address this
issue. A trusted delegate, which we call data broker, is used to
represent a group of users. A data contract is also generated
on the control plane for the data broker. However, different
from a single data owner contract, the data broker contract
also provides the functionality to allow individual users to
delegate secret provisioning to the data broker. The related
functions are listed in Algorithm 2. When a data owner
wants to make use of the data broker, he will first invoke
RegisterUserDataSource to initiate the registration of his data
in the data broker. In the data plane, the data owner will
need to remotely attest the data broker. If the data broker
can be trusted, the data owner will then provision the data
secret key to the data broker. This, however, is not the
end of data registration, because the data source and quality
still need to be verified by the data broker. Once verified,
the data broker invokes ConfirmUserDataSourceRegistry to
complete the data registration. Furthermore, certain functions
used in result commitment are also different for data broker.
CompleteTransaction now needs to record the data usage for
all the data owners for which the data transaction covers. And
the financial reward should be redistributed to the data owner.
The other data related functions are identical to that presented
in Algorithm 1. Another motivation for using data broker
is to address the scalability challenge in remote attestation
for establishing local consensus among a large group of data
owners, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.
Algorithm 2: Data Broker (DB) Smart Contract CDB
Init: Initialize from DB the contract creator
pendingDataSourceList[] ← null ;
dataSourceList[] ← null ;
/* Callable by DO */
RegisterUserDataSource:
Receive registerRequest(operation, price, authorizedList)
add (IDdataOwner , registerRequest) to pendingDataSourceList ;
/* Callable by DB */
ConfirmUserDataSourceRegistry:
if sender=IDdatabroker then
add pendingDataSourceList[IDdataOwner] to dataSourceList
/* Callable by DB */
CompleteTransaction: Receive Kresult from DB
if KresultHash = Hash(Kresult) then
Record data usage [Op,DC,Dtarget, timestamp] ;
Distribute $f to WDO for all involved DOs ;
else
exit ;
RequestDataUse: (same as in CDA)
ComputationComplete: (same as in CDA)
Cancel: (same as in CDA, callable by DB)
RevokeContract: (same as in CDA, callable by DB)
V. OFF-CHAIN CONTRACT EXECUTION
PrivacyGuard leverages blockchain to provide the control
mechanisms for valued data exchanges. While the technology
offers a distributed time-stamped ledger which is ideal in
providing a transparent recording of individual data use, smart
contract suffers from several prohibiting drawbacks when it
comes to confidential data computation. First, data has to be
decrypted and stored on the chain. Second, a smart contract is
executed by all participating nodes in the network, therefore
the cost to run complex algorithm is prohibitive even assuming
data storage is not an issue.
Fig. 3. Off-chain Contract Execution Overview
To tackle this problem, we introduce the concept of off-
chain contract execution in PrivacyGuard to bring both the
computation and data provisioning off-chain. Intuitively, we
decompose smart contract into two portions, the control part
and the computation part. The execution of a contract function
will, therefore, be broken into multiple segments. As shown
in Fig. 3, control flow will stop at the computation task and
continue off-chain. The function is then resumed with another
smart contract invocation when the off-chain computation task
is finished. While the idea is simple, there are several unique
challenges in maintaining the security of the decomposed
smart contract functions, especially when the availability of
the off-chain execution can be manipulated by the adversary.
A workflow of off-chain contract execution is shown in
Fig. 4, the system has three stages from the high level, the
off-chain contract initialization (step 1 to 4) that takes con-
tract execution flow from the blockchain to trusted execution
environment, off-chain contract execution (step 5), and lastly
the off-chain contract completion with the result release (step 6
– 10) that takes contract execution flow from trusted execution
environment back to the blockchain. In the remainder of the
section, instead of elaborating on the workflow details, we
will highlight our design principles in addressing challenges
in executing contracts off-chain.
A. Establishing Trust with Local “Consensus”
The first challenge is correct execution of the contracted
function. When smart contracts are executed on blockchain
platform, the correctness of the execution is guaranteed by the
entire network. Every node in the network executes the same
contract and reaches consensus on the result. The fundamental
problem is the method of consensus. If the computation task
Fig. 4. Off-chain Contract Execution for Data Transaction
has to be repeated by all nodes to reach consensus, then
not only will there be prohibitive cost, but there will also
be confidentiality problem. Furthermore, not all the nodes
are equipped with the right hardware to perform those data
computation at a reasonable cost.
Our observation is that the correctness of one particular
computation instance only matters to the participating parties
of the data transaction, i.e. the data provider (data owner
or data broker) and the data consumer. Suppose if a data
consumer, such as an election strategy office, is interested in
analyzing the demographic data from a voting district which
is polled by a dedicated data broker, then the correctness
of the analysis (e.g. voting tendency) matters to the election
office, since he is the direct consumer of the data. On the
other hand, the correctness of the analysis also matters to the
data broker, because he wants to make sure it was only the
analysis result that’s released, not individual users’ data. Other
than the data consumer and the data broker, no one needs to
be concerned about the analysis. As a result, we don’t need
the entire network to acknowledge the correctness of the data
computation and the consensus can be narrowed to only the
participants of the data transaction.
In the conventional setting of distributed consensus, both
the data consumer and data provider will perform the data
operation and expect the same result from each other. How-
ever, it contradicts our initial goal of fine grain control on data
usage if the data are directly provided to data consumers. To
tackle this problem, we rely on the software remote attestation,
which is widely available as primitive in trusted execution en-
vironments [26], [27]. By specifying the configuration hash in
the smart contract, all of the participating parties can remotely
attest the program in trusted execution environment to verify
the authenticity of the loaded program, and gain confidence
in the correctness of the execution. As a result, as shown in
Fig. 4, the first step immediately after data transaction request
is to perform remote attestation on the off-chain contract
execution environment (CEE). Once correctly verified, both
sides of the contracting parties can then extend their trust
to CEE, knowing the environment will allow the attested
program to execute securely till termination, and therefore
results produced by this entity would be the consensus of both
the data consumer and data broker.
B. Enforcement of Contracted Data Operation
Enforcement of data operation is the second challenge we
address in our design. One of the primary motivations to em-
ploy trusted execution environment for the off-chain contract
execution environment is its ability to allow a remote party to
measure the computation to be performed inside the container.
Furthermore, the computation will be executed with minimal
influence from external environment even if the adversary
can control the operating system. The measurement process
is often referred to as remote attestation. More specifically,
as one of the building blocks for TEEs, remote attestation
allows a verifier to authenticate the enclave configuration of
the prover remotely, including code and data of the software
as well as the platform configuration. During this process,
the prover generates a unique cryptographically signed proof
of the current configuration. The verifier first verifies the
authenticity of the proof by examining the signature, then
checks to see if the configuration is as expected.
In PrivacyGuard, we propose to employ the remote attesta-
tion capability in Intel SGX to verify that the binary loaded in
the enclave (i.e. the operation to be executed) is compliant with
the contract. The configuration checksum, which represents the
type of computation that can be performed on data is stored
in the smart contract as a variable. During the initialization
of the off-chain contract execution, each contracting party
individually verifies that the configuration of the program
loaded in the CEE enclave is indeed the one that is specified
by the contract. Only when all entities involved in the contract
reach the local consensus via remote attestation, will the
execution of off-chain smart contract continue. As shown in
Figure 4, only after the successful remote attestation of the off-
chain CEE by DC in step 2 and by DO in step 4, will the DB
provision to off-chain CEE the data decryption key, which
enables the data operation program inside CEE to decrypt
the data and continue.
C. Enforcement of Data Obligation
With the two components above, the data intensive compu-
tation can be offloaded to off-chain computing platform while
maintaining the correctness of computation. However, in order
to achieve the privacy goals of PrivacyGuard, computation
itself has to fulfill the data obligation, which we refer to as
the obligations of the data consumer for utilizing the user
data. More specifically, it follows the general requirement
of secure computation, wherein only the computation result
is accessible by the data consumer, not the original source
data. This requirement has several implications on the data
computation program. First, it should not output any decrypted
source data or any intermediate results that are derived from
the source data. Second, at the end of the computation, all
decrypted data and intermediate results should be sanitized.
Despite recent breakthrough in fully homomorphic encryp-
tion, performing arbitrary computation over encrypted data
remains impractical for generic computation. In PrivacyGuard,
we make use of trusted execution environment, such as Intel
SGX, to create the environment for confidential computing,
where the kdata will only be provisioned to the container
if it can be cryptographically verified via remote attestation.
The hardware, the processor specifically, enforces the isola-
tion between the platform and the container. Since memory
contents are encrypted in Intel SGX, once the keying material
is removed, the data can effectively be considered sanitized.
Therefore, we want to make sure that the program inside the
enclave container will terminate once the contracted task is
completed.
Algorithm 3: Program for Off-chain Contract Execution
(CExeProgenclave)
Function Initialize (ReqDataOp)
parse request as (DC,DO,Op,data,sig) ;
send ReqDataOp and σatt to DO ;
send ReqDataOp and σatt to DC ;
Function OnDataOpeationApproval (approval)
Parse approval as (pkapprover , OpUid, skop, sigapprover) ;
if ¬SigVerify(sigapprover) then
terminate ;
if approverDC then
skrec← skop
if approverDO then
skdec← skop
if ¬ approvalDO ∨ ¬ approvalDC then
terminate ;
CData ← loadFromStorage ;
Data ← Σ.Decrypt(CData,skdec) ;
result := Op(Data) ;
grec := Gmax ;
σ := Σ.Sign(skdc) ;
The pseudo-code for off-chain CEE is listed in Algo-
rithm. 3. CExeProgenclave denotes the contract execution
enclave program. Additionally, kdata is the decryption key
from DO for data under contract. Upon initialization, CEE
will receive key materials from DO providing the attestation
report σatt is successfully verified. The program will continue
to run using the encrypted data from Cloud storage, and kdata
from DO. When the data operation is completed, the results
will be written to Cloud storage and the enclave program will
terminate, thus sanitizing all the original data and immediate
results.
D. Ensuring Atomicity in Off-Chain Contract Execution
The last challenge is ensuring the atomicity of the contract,
which arises from the off-chain contract loading. Contract
functions that were previously executed in a single block
are now completed via multiple function invocations that are
executed in multiple blocks. Furthermore, there is no guarantee
on the execution time of the off-chain computation, because
an adversary controlling the platform can always interrupt the
computation. This is one of the challenges for our proposed
method of “local consensus”. Specifically, two issues need
to be addressed: contract function runtime and atomic result
release.
The first issue is the contract function runtime. When the
adversary has control of the off-chain computation platform,
he can pause or delay the computation. For many data com-
putations, the result can be time-sensitive. For example, in
real-time location-aware advertising, if the advertisement is
not delivered to the consumer while she is still in the vicinity,
the advertising effectiveness can be significantly reduced.
To tackle this problem, we add a time limit data operation
function in the data contract. After the time limit, either of
the participating parties, namely DC or DO can cancel the
contract after this time limit, thus protecting their investment.
The second issue is the atomic completion of the contract,
in which we would like to allow both the DO to get the
payment in the control plane while allowing DC to get the
computation results. This particularly challenging due to the
lack of availability guarantee on the platform for off-chain
computation. Using local consensus where correctness is now
guaranteed using remote attestation from participating parties,
computation are only executed at one location. When that
platform is compromised, the availability can no longer be
guaranteed. The implication of this is that the adversary can
intercept and modify any external I/O from the container,
including both the network and storage. Our design for the
atomic completion can be observed from the last two steps
shown in Fig. 4. The key idea is that result release and contract
completion should be done as a single message in the control
platform. To prevent DC from getting the result and not
complete the payment to DO. The results are encrypted and
signed before being written to the Cloud storage. Since the
platform can corrupt any output from the TEE, the results
include cryptographic checksum that can be authenticated.
The DC obtains this result and verify its integrity. To make
sure that DO will not be able to complete the transaction
with an arbitrary key, DC will also receive a commitment
of the key that is used to encrypt the data operation results.
In PrivacyGuard, we use a hash as commitment, however,
any type of commit protocol should apply. DC then invokes
the smart contract in the control plane stating that it has the
encrypted result and is ready to finish the data transaction if
and only if the final result key that is bound by the commitment
is released. Upon observing the proof of publication of the
message from DC, DO will then send a message to the data
contract completing the transaction including the result key
kresult in the function invocation. Only when the hash of the
key matches the commitment, will the contract write the data
usage into records, release the payment to DO, and finally
conclude the data transaction.
E. Using Data Broker for Scalability
One of the challenges in PrivacyGuard is the scalability
limitation in the blockchain platform, which we discussed in
the previous section. To alleviate the pressure on the control
infrastructure, we introduced data broker. Another scalability
challenge originates from the need to use a large amount of
different types of data from different users, which results in
a large number of remote attestations for the local consensus.
When CEE needs to use data from a large number of users,
naive use of remote attestation would require each iDA to
individually attest and verify CEE, resulting in significant
cost in both computation and network throughput. One solu-
tion to address this scalability problem is to create a trusted
intermediate using SGX enclave to attest CEE for all the
associated iDAs. The cost is then constant instead of linear to
the number of DOs for data DC uses. We will incrementally
experiment with prototypes and designs to enable efficient and
scalable remote attestation.
Algorithm 4: Program for data broker TEE
Function OnRecvDataUseRequest (request)
Parse request as (pkDC ,data, op, σatt, pkce, T ) ;
/* verify the access right on the contract */
if ¬CheckAccessRight(pkDC ,data) then
terminate ;
if ¬VerifyAttestation(pkDC ,σatt[CExeProgenclave]) then
terminate ;
transmit(list(kdata),AddrCEE ) ;
storeDataAccessOffChainForAllUsers() ;
storeDataAccessOnChainForTheContractedUsage() ;
Function OnRegisteringForData (request)
Parse request as (pkDC , linkdata, op list, skdata,σatt, T ) ;
if ¬CheckDataRegisterOnChain(pkDC ,linkdata) then
terminate ;
if ¬VerifyData(linkdata,skdata) then
terminate ;
completeOnChainDataRegister() ;
Function OnCompletionOfDataTransaction (request)
parse request as (kresult)
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION SETTING
We implemented a prototype of PrivacyGuard. There are
five main applications, namely iDataAgent (iDA), Data Broker
(DB), Data Consumer (DC), Contract Execution Environment
(CEE), Data Owner (DO). All of them are implemented in
C++ using Intel SGX SDK v2.3.1 on top of Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
The total software lines of code (SLOC) for C++ components
is 37,788. The on-chain components, namely the DO contract
and the DB contract, are implemented in Solidity with 144
and 162 SLOC respectively. However, even though our system
is fully compatible with Ethereum, we implemented and tested
our prototype in the Rinkeby testnet, a proof-of-authority
based blockchain offering faster and more stable transaction
confirmation than the proof-of-work based main chain [52].
Table I summarizes the system implementation and evaluation
parameters. The source code of the project is available at
XXX1.
1Will be revealed at publication.
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF SYSTEM SETTINGS FOR EVALUATION
Item Description Value/Size
N Number of DOs 1→ 128
P1 Price of one data item 0.01 ethers
Pg Gas price 1e-9 ethers
MNN Neural Net Classifier Model 14× 8× 8× 2
MNN .EPC Max training epoch number 10,000
MNN .ERR Desired training error 0.001
DSadult UCL ML Repo’s Adult dataset 48842 data points
d size # of data points for each DO 500
A. Multi-thread Implementation
Enclave based applications often need to handle concurrent
enclave operations. For example, DB may need to attest
to multiple DOs at the same time, while the CEE may be
required to execute parallel data operation tasks. Our imple-
mentation achieves these by harnessing the multi-threading
capability of SGX enclave. The maximum thread number
for CEE enclave (TCSNUM) is configured accordingly to
accommodate the expected load [53].
Parallel Attestation: In the remote attestation protocol pro-
vided by Intel, a variable named attestation context operates in
a state-machine manner to mark the progress of the protocol.
In our implementation of DB, every attestation thread creates
its own attestation context. In the end, every thread will result
in the same attestation context and establish a secure channel
between the enclave and the corresponding DO. Note that
although CEE is primarily responsible for executing data
operations, it is also capable of handling concurrent attestation
requests from DOs if they choose not to rely on DB.
B. Data Operation
We use the adult dataset DSadult from UCI Machine
Learning Repository [54] which contains 48,842 records of
consensus income data across 40 countries. Each data record
contains 14 attributes and an income label of either <= 50K
or > 50K. To simulate the data generation of DOs, each DO
randomly sampled 500 data points from DSadult to be its
private data.
We designed a simple data operation task for the CEE:
training a 14×8×8×2 neural network classifier with training
epoch numberMNN .EPC = 10, 000 and the desired training
error MNN .ERR = 0.001, which makes the training task
moderately time consuming. Other detailed model parameters
can be found in our source code.
VII. EVALUATION RESULT
We aim to analyze the high level performance cost and over-
head of conducting data operations using PrivacyGuard. Up
to 160 DOs and the DC are running on a non-SGX machine
while the Data Broker, iDataAgent, and CEE are running
on an SGX-machine (Intel NUC KIT NUC7i5BNH). Table
II summarizes the detailed hardware specification. The two
machines are connected in a gigabyte LAN. The evaluation
TABLE II
HARDWARE SPECIFICATION
SGX Machine Non-SGX Machine
CPU Intel Core i5-7260U AMD FX-8320
(2 cores 4 threads, 3.5GHz) (4 cores 8 threads, 3.5GHz)
Memory 16GB 32 GB
OS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Apps 1 DataBroker, 1 iDataAgent, 128 DataOwners,
1 CEE 1 DataConsumer
TABLE III
AVERAGE RUNTIMES OF KEY CONTROL PLANE OPERATIONS
Operation Avg. Time (s) STD
DB attesting enclave to DO 1.068 0.010
DB receiving & processing DO’s data 0.003 0.001
DO calling DB contract’s Register() 13.141∗ 4.008
DB calling DB contract’s Confirm() 10.385∗ 5.237
DC calling DB contract’s Request() 13.067∗ 4.036
DC getting iDA’s approval 0.488 0.029
CEE attesting enclave to DB 1.074 0.012
CEE attesting enclave to DC 1.072 0.015
DC calling contract’s ComputationComplete() 12.245∗ 4.298
DB calling contract’s CompleteTransaction() 15.888∗ 5.605
*Time until the contract function call succeeds. Note that there are different
finality criteria in Ethereum blockchain to judge the success of a transaction.
The commonly used are receipt (once being mined in a block) and confirma-
tion (once being confirmed by 12 subsequent blocks). Here we use receipt as
the success event of the transaction that makes the function call. This is also
used in Fig. 5(c).
was conducted in three parts: control plane runtimes, control
plane costs, and data plane runtimes.
A. Control Plane Runtimes
We ran the control flow of PrivacyGuard ten times to obtain
the average runtime of each control operation. The ten runs
were evenly spread out from 8:00am to 5:00 pm on the day of
11/1/2018 to reflect the varying nature of the response times
of the underlying blockchain. From the results shown in Table
III, we find that non-contract-call operations typically have
much shorter runtimes, meanwhile the contract calls may take
up to 20 seconds to be written in the blockchain, which is
consistent with the 15-second block interval of Rinkeby. Due
to the varying network conditions, contract call runtimes also
tend to have higher variations.
To evaluate the scalability of the remote attestations to
multiple DOs, we tested the scenario where N DOs simulta-
neously attest the DB or CEE. The experiment was repeated
under different maximum thread numbers (TCSNUM). The
attestation becomes a sequential process with no parallelism
when TCSNUM=1. The result is shown in Fig. 5(a) and 5(b).
For both DB or CEE, multi-thread attestation is significantly
faster than sequential attestation. When N=128, the 128-thread
DB and the 4-thread CEE take less than 1/18 and 1/3
attestation time of their sequential counterparts respectively.
To further evaluate the performance constraints imposed by
the underlying blockchain network, we measured the average
transaction finalization delay in a congested environment. To
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. (a,b) Attestation times of DB and CEE when N DOs simultaneously starts the attestation. The zig-zags in a curve are the result of batch operations
when the requests outnumber the available threads. (c) Average time to finalize when N DOs simultaneously call the register() function in their own DO
contracts or the DB contract.
simulate the congestion as much as possible, we set up 160
DOs to simultaneously send out a transaction calling the
Register() function in the DB contract and their own DO
contracts. The result is shown in Fig. 5(c). As more DOs send
transactions at the same time, the average time to finalize a
transaction increases dramatically. Since the scalability of the
underlying blockchain is an orthogonal problem, an alternative
solution is to require DOs to call the Register() function
according to a time schedule that minimizes congestion.
B. Control Plane Cost
The monetary cost of the control plane mainly comes from
the gas cost of operating smart contracts. At the start, every
DO registers its data item on its own contract and the DB
contract. The DB fetches data from whoever registered with
its contract and routinely confirms all new registries. The Data
Consumer then requests for the data items from all N DOs by
sending a request transaction to the DB contract (or separate
requests to the DO contracts) with a sufficient deposit to cover
the price before proceeding to enclave attestation and data
operation. We repeated the experiment for N = 1 → 10 and
obtained the gas costs and dollar equivalents for each contract
function call, based on the fixed gas price Pg = 10−9 ethers
and the price of ether on 10/31/2018, which was $197.852.
We find that in both DB and DO contracts the costs of
calling register() and cancel() do not depend on the number
of registered DOs. We call these type of function calls
scale-independent, which also include calling constructor()
(contract creation). In contrast the function calls whose costs
depend on the number of registered DOs are called scale-
dependent. The costs of scale-independent function calls and
scale-dependent functions calls are shown in Table IV and
Fig. 6(a) respectively. The cost of every scale-dependent
call grows near linearly with the number of DOs. Notably,
the costs of request() and ComputationComplete() called by
the Data Consumer grow faster than the costs of Confirm()
and CompleteTransaction() called by the DB. This implies
the total cost will increasingly become the burden of the
2Source: https://coinmarketcap.com/
TABLE IV
COST OF THE DATA BROKER CONTRACT’S SCALE-INDEPENDENT
FUNCTION CALLS
Contract Function Caller Cost (gas) Dollar Equiv.*
Data Constructor() DB 951747 $0.18830
Broker Register() (new) DO 156414 $0.03095
Register() (update) DO 30121 $0.00596
Cancel() DC 81998 $0.01622
Data Constructor() DO 846794 $0.16754
Owner Register() (new) DO 125392 $0.02481
Register() (update) DO 45177 $0.00894
Cancel() DC 66954 $0.01325
*Based on the gas price of 10−9 ethers and the ether price of $197.85 on
10/31/2018.
DataConsumer, which is a scalable trend for the system, as
the Data Consumer always has more incentives to pay for
data usage.
To evaluate the scalability gain brought by the DB, here we
compare the base case where individual DOs share individual
data via their own contracts versus via the DB contract. In
both cases, the total amount of data requested by the DC and
subsequently operated with by the CEE are the same. We
counted the costs of all function calls except for the contract
creation (calling Constructor()) and computed the total cost.
The result in Fig. 6(b) shows that it costs the DB based system
much less gases to accommodate one extra DO ($0.04242)
compared to that of the iDataAgent based system ($0.08522).
This result together with the result of control plane runtimes
(Fig. 5) have verified DB’s ability to provide financial and
performance scalability to PrivacyGuard in face of a growing
number of DOs.
C. Data Plane Cost
The security provided by SGX enclave comes at a cost of
efficiency. To evaluate such cost, we implemented an untrusted
version (outside enclave) of the data operation task that runs
on the same Linux machine. Since in the trusted version the
enclave takes in encrypted data and decrypts it before data
operation, in this test we directly fed unencrypted data to
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. (a) Gas costs of the DB contract’s scale-dependent function calls. (b) Total gas costs of the DB based system and the iDataAgent based system. The
dollar equivalents are computed based on the gas price of 10−9 ethers and the ether price of $197.85 on 10/31/2018. (c) Runtimes of training a 14×8×8×2
neural network classifier for different training data sizes under four hardware settings.
the enclave to make it a fair comparison, as the untrusted
version doesn’t have to deal with encrypted data. Moreover,
recent works show Intel’s Hyperthreading Technology (HTT)
has flaws that may impair the security of SGX enclaves [39].
To evaluate the impact of enclave and HTT on computa-
tion time, we first disabled the CPU’s TurboBoost feature
to avoid nonlinear CPU performance boost and carried out
our data plane experiment under four different hardware op-
tions: 1) inside-enclave-HTT-enabled, 2) outside-enclave-HTT-
enabled, 3) inside-enclave-HTT-disabled, 4) outside-enclave-
HTT-disabled.
Figure 6(c) shows time consumption of training the men-
tioned neural network classifier under four hardware options.
Table V summarizes the average overheads and shows the
marginal overhead caused by either enclave or disabling
HTT. Column-wisely, we can see the overheads caused by
disabling HTT are 17.99% and 48.84% for outside-enclave
and inside-enclave respectively. This implies disabling HTT
will significantly increase the runtime inside enclave. Row-
wisely, the overheads caused by enclave are 196.55% and
274.13% for HTT-enabled and HTT-disabled respectively. This
means running programs in enclave is significantly more time
consuming than outside enclave, at least for our this four-layer
neural network training. And this overhead exacerbates when
HTT is disabled. A possible explanation for this overhead is
the mismatch between the machine learning program’s high
need for parallelism and the limited multi-threading capability
of SGX enclaves, which assign logical threads to enclave
applications up to the processor limit of the CPU. Another
possible factor is memory usage of SGX. For example the
L3 cache accessible to SGX may be far from enough to
accommodate the machine learning task. We will study the
performance caveats of Intel SGX and possible solutions in
future works.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
PrivacyGuard has two key components, namely blockchain
in the control plane and the trusted execution environment in
the data plane. The security properties of these two primitives
have received significant amount of attentions recently [39],
TABLE V
AVERAGE RUNTIME OVERHEAD CAUSED BY SGX ENCLAVE AND
DISABLING HTT
Avg. Runtime HTT HTT
Overhead Enabled Disabled *Marginal
Outside Enclave 0 17.99% –
Inside Enclave 196.55% 341.37% 48.83%
*Marginal – 274.13% –
*Marginal overhead is the relative runtime overhead for the specific row/column.
[44], [45], [55], [50], [36], [32], [30]. In the discussion
below, the focus will be on issues in harmonizing the trusted
execution environment and blockchain. More specifically, in
PrivacyGuard, a single on-chain contract function is parti-
tioned into multiple functions with both on-chain and off-chain
components with the proposed off-chain execution technique.
This technique has opened new avenues for adversaries that are
not previously available on conventional blockchain platform.
A. Exploiting Control of Cloud Platform
Off-chain contract execution significantly reduces the com-
putation load on the network, but at the same time, also
provides a single point of failure for the adversary to launch
attack. When the attacker is able to compromise the cloud
platform, there are several attacks she can launch. During
the execution of the off-chain contract stage, the adversary
can stop the program at any point of time, and also drop
or reorder any message. However, he cannot tamper with the
content of the network message as long as the connection is
secured. Anticipating the execution of the data contract can
be halted by the adversary at any stage, our design on the
data contracts allows any party to abort the data transaction
without incurring financial loss. The attacker may also attempt
to launch side channel attack or directly attempt to exploit
a software vulnerabilityt in the data analytic program within
the SGX enclave, and is out of the scope of this paper. It
should however be noted that, system implementations are
often imperfect. Due to the use of TEE to provide secure
execution environment for the data analytic program, our
system inherits vulnerabilities of in implementation of both
TEE and data analytic program.
B. Exploiting the Incoherence Between Data Plane and Con-
trol Plane in Result Commitment
There are three main players in the last stage (result com-
mitment and release) of the data operation contract: DO, DB
and the Cloud. Ideally, the release of the data and the deposit
should be an atomic decision. However, with the separation
of control plane and the data plane, these operations have
become inherently non-atomic. This is further complicated
by the fact that there is lack of availability guarantee for
the TEE technology we choose to implement PrivacyGuard,
Intel SGX. Transactions on blockchain is used to signal the
completion of the data operations and enable the completion
of the financial transaction for the data use. On the other
hand, this does not necessarily guarantee the delivery of result
to the data consumer who has already paid for the service
using the control plane operation on the blockchain. There are
several ways an adversary can attack our result commitment
and release protocol.
1) DO controls the cloud: The DO or DB can attempt
to complete the data transaction without uploading the experi-
ment result. Using the control of the Cloud platform, the DO
can either maliciously modify the data operation result or he
can simply deny the output of results. This attack is thwarted
by having the dataOperationComplete contract function to
enforce the result commitment before completing the data
transaction.
2) DC controls the cloud: Under unlikely circumstances,
if a malicious DC is powerful enough to compromise the
platform which DB and DO are running on, he might be
able to capture the last commitment message to get the
result release key, but never forward the blockchain invocation
message to the network. This way, the DC can obtain the
result without completing the payment. However, with an
increasing number of nodes accepting transaction broadcasts
in secure manner, even though the adversary might be able to
block all the connection, he cannot break the secure connection
by launching man-in-the-middle attack. This attack is thwarted
by our system sending the CompleteTransaction message
to a collection of transaction recipients in secure channels.
The CompleteTransaction message, which contains the result
release key, will only be transmitted if the secure channel can
be established. Therefore the adversary would have to block
all of the traffic, otherwise he cannot block the transaction
broadcasts. When all the network connections are blocked, the
result will never be released, which is not a problem for DB
and DO. When the adversary can only block a subset of the
result broadcast messages, the data transaction will continue to
complete and thus is not an issue either. Furthermore, it is also
possible to add functionality to verify the proof of publication
in data broker instead of relying on broadingcasting via secure
channel.
IX. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy Protection
Privacy-preserving computation has been an active area of
research in the past decade [37], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60].
With the increasing reliance on rich data, there has been
a significant amount of research on applying cryptographic
techniques to perform privacy preserving computation [61],
[25], [58], [59]. Recently, hardware-assisted secure environ-
ment has also become a popular component in these privacy-
preserving computation system due to its attractive security
features, such as enabling application level secure container
in the Intel SGX. Secure enclave technology [26] has been
adapted in numerous works to achieve privacy-preserving
computation [57], [37], [56], [62], [63], [64]. Ryoan [37]
is closely related to PrivacyGuard. It combines native client
sandbox and Intel SGX to confine data processing module.
Similar to PrivacyGuard, it protects the confidentiality of
data using trusted execution environment. However, Ryoan
aims to achieve data confinement with a user-defined directed
acyclic graph that specifies information flow. In comparison,
PrivacyGuard allows data user and consumer to negotiate data
usage using smart contract, and provides transparent recording
on the data usage.
When the data processing system can be trusted, there is
a large body of work studying privacy languages and their
enforcement systems [17], [18], [19]. Unlike the aforemen-
tioned systems, PrivacyGuard aims to enable secure processing
without relying on the integrity of the platform.
B. Blockchain Application
The idea of moving computation off-chain to improve the
performance and security is mentioned in [65], [31], [20],
[30]. Choudhuri et al. [65] combines blockchain with TEE
to build one-time programs that resemble to smart contracts
but only aim for a restricted functionality. Arbitrum [31], is
a system that delegates the task of smart contract verification
to a small subset of managers that are incentivized to exe-
cute the virtual machines honestly. Different from Arbitrum,
PrivacyGuard focuses on moving computation off-chain using
trusted execution and local consensus that involve only the
contract participating parties. The Intel Private Data Object
(PDO) project [20] and the Ekiden [30] are two concurrently
developed projects that are closely related to PrivacyGuard.
Similar to PrivacyGuard, Ekiden aims to combine trusted
computing and distributed ledger to enable confidential con-
tract execution. However, Ekiden [30] aims to modify the
blockchain ecosystem to enable the off-chain execution in a
collection of computer nodes. In comparison, PrivacyGuard is
designed, implemented and evaluated on existing blockchain
infrastructure. The Intel PDO [20] is another project that
aims to combine Intel SGX and distributed ledger to allow
distrusting parties to work on the data in a confidential manner.
However, the system focuses heavily on a permission-based
model with significant overhead for bootstrapping trust.
Several other related works aim to guarantee the compu-
tation integrity but not the privacy [66], [67]. Others use
blockchain as a platform for incentives and penalties [68],
[69], [70], [31]. Compared to the aforementioned methods,
PrivacyGuard is designed to enable large-scale and complex
data market operations using TEE. There have also been
several research work that utilize blockchain as a platform to
enable flexible data access control [71], [72], [16]. However,
none of them provide a concrete design and implementation
that would allow fine-grained control of data usage.
The confidentiality issue of smart contracts has also at-
tracted a significant amount of attention in the past few years.
Researchers attempt to use cryptographic techniques to fix
the problems [65], [32], [73], [30], [74]. The possibility of
using trusted hardware for blockchain process is discussed in
Hawk [32], and also realized in [30], [65], [75], [20], [76].
The Coco framework [76] is proposed to use trusted execution
environment to protect the confidentiality of smart contracts
in Ethereum. However, there is only a high-level description
in its whitepaper.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed PrivacyGuard, a data exchange
platform that combines blockchain and secure execution envi-
ronment to enable fine-grained data use control and tracking.
Our system provides a technical solution to address one of the
most important privacy issues in data analytics—transparent
enforcement of data use. Blockchain can not only be used
as a tamper-proof platform that records data use, but also
facilitate financial transactions to incentivize data sharing.
To enable complex and confidential operations on private
data, PrivacyGuard splits smart contract function into control
operations and data operations. Remote attestation and trusted
execution environment are used to achieve local consensus
of all contract participating parties on the a data operating
platform. Atomicity of the contract completion is facilitated
by a commitment protocol before the result release. We
implemented and open-sourced our PrivacyGuard platform and
evaluated it in a simulated data market. Our evaluation result
shows the feasibility of executing complex data operations in
a confidential manner using the platform. In the future, we
plan to further investigate the economic aspect of the private
data market enabled by PrivacyGuard.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Rajpurkar, J. Irvin, K. Zhu, B. Yang, H. Mehta, T. Duan, D. Ding,
A. Bagul, C. Langlotz, K. Shpanskaya, et al., “Chexnet: Radiologist-
level pneumonia detection on chest x-rays with deep learning,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1711.05225, 2017.
[2] “Facebookcambridge analytica data scandal.” https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Facebook%E2%80%93Cambridge Analytica data scandal.
[3] “How tech companies deceive you into giving up your data and privacy.”
https://goo.gl/hSfaUX.
[4] “Tim cook: Personal data collection is being ’weaponized against us
with military efficiency’.” https://goo.gl/BsWB3k.
[5] H. Nissenbaum, “Privacy as contextual integrity,” Wash. L. Rev., vol. 79,
p. 119, 2004.
[6] “National privacy research strategy.” https://www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/
NationalPrivacyResearchStrategy.pdf.
[7] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryp-
tion for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings of
the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS ’06, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 89–98, ACM, 2006.
[8] A. Sahai, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption,” in In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 321–334,
2007.
[9] G. Wang, Q. Liu, and J. Wu, “Hierarchical attribute-based encryption for
fine-grained access control in cloud storage services,” in Proceedings of
the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS ’10, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 735–737, ACM, 2010.
[10] S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Achieving secure, scalable, and
fine-grained data access control in cloud computing,” in Infocom, 2010
proceedings IEEE, pp. 1–9, Ieee, 2010.
[11] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Interna-
tional Conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume
Part II, ICALP’06, (Berlin, Heidelberg), pp. 1–12, Springer-Verlag,
2006.
[12] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. Gehrke, and M. Venkitasubramaniam,
“L-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity,” ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov.
Data, vol. 1, Mar. 2007.
[13] L. Sweeney, “K-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” Int. J.
Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowl.-Based Syst., vol. 10, pp. 557–570, Oct.
2002.
[14] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian, “t-closeness: Privacy beyond
k-anonymity and l-diversity,” in Data Engineering, 2007. ICDE 2007.
IEEE 23rd International Conference on, pp. 106–115, IEEE, 2007.
[15] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. S. Pentland, “Decentralizing privacy:
Using blockchain to protect personal data,” in Security and Privacy
Workshops (SPW), IEEE, 2015.
[16] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. Pentland, “Enigma: Decentral-
ized computation platform with guaranteed privacy,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1506.03471, 2015.
[17] S. Sen, S. Guha, A. Datta, S. K. Rajamani, J. Tsai, and J. M. Wing,
“Bootstrapping privacy compliance in big data systems,” in Security and
Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on, pp. 327–342, IEEE, 2014.
[18] E. Elnikety, A. Mehta, A. Vahldiek-Oberwagner, D. Garg, and P. Dr-
uschel, “Thoth: Comprehensive policy compliance in data retrieval
systems.,” in USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 637–654, 2016.
[19] A. Datta, M. Fredrikson, G. Ko, P. Mardziel, and S. Sen, “Use privacy
in data-driven systems: Theory and experiments with machine learnt
programs,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pp. 1193–1210, ACM, 2017.
[20] M. Bowman, A. Miele, M. Steiner, and B. Vavala, “Private data objects:
an overview,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.05686, 2018.
[21] B. Custers and H. Ursˇicˇ, “Big data and data reuse: a taxonomy of
data reuse for balancing big data benefits and personal data protection,”
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 4–15, 2016.
[22] “Why transparency is critical in this data economy.” https:
//www.forbes.com/sites/michaelmarrale/2018/07/23/the-almighty-data/
#718653b14bd2.
[23] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[24] “Ethereum: Blockchain app platform.” https://www.ethereum.org/.
[25] D. Boneh, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Functional encryption: Definitions
and challenges,” in Theory of Cryptography Conference, pp. 253–273,
Springer, 2011.
[26] F. McKeen, I. Alexandrovich, A. Berenzon, C. V. Rozas, H. Shafi,
V. Shanbhogue, and U. R. Savagaonkar, “Innovative instructions and
software model for isolated execution.,” in HASP@ ISCA, p. 10, 2013.
[27] “ARM Security Technology, Building a Secure System using TrustZone
Technology,” apr 2009.
[28] N. Szabo, “Formalizing and securing relationships on public networks,”
First Monday, vol. 2, no. 9, 1997.
[29] K. Croman, C. Decker, I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, A. Juels, A. Kosba,
A. Miller, P. Saxena, E. Shi, E. G. Sirer, et al., “On scaling decentralized
blockchains,” in International Conference on Financial Cryptography
and Data Security, pp. 106–125, Springer, 2016.
[30] R. Cheng, F. Zhang, J. Kos, W. He, N. Hynes, N. Johnson, A. Juels,
A. Miller, and D. Song, “Ekiden: A platform for confidentiality-
preserving, trustworthy, and performant smart contract execution,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.05141, 2018.
[31] H. Kalodner, S. Goldfeder, X. Chen, S. M. Weinberg, and E. W. Felten,
“Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 27th
USENIX Conference on Security Symposium, pp. 1353–1370, USENIX
Association, 2018.
[32] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk:
The blockchain model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart
contracts,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on,
pp. 839–858, IEEE, 2016.
[33] D. Song, J. Lettner, P. Rajasekaran, Y. Na, S. Volckaert, P. Larsen, and
M. Franz, “Sok: Sanitizing for security,” in 2019 2019 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy (SP), vol. 00, pp. 187–207.
[34] V. Costan, I. A. Lebedev, and S. Devadas, “Sanctum: Minimal hardware
extensions for strong software isolation.,” in USENIX Security Sympo-
sium, pp. 857–874, 2016.
[35] B. Fisch, D. Vinayagamurthy, D. Boneh, and S. Gorbunov, “Iron:
functional encryption using intel sgx,” in Proceedings of the 2017
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pp. 765–782, ACM, 2017.
[36] F. Zhang, E. Cecchetti, K. Croman, A. Juels, and E. Shi, “Town crier: An
authenticated data feed for smart contracts,” in Proceedings of the 2016
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pp. 270–282, ACM, 2016.
[37] T. Hunt, Z. Zhu, Y. Xu, S. Peter, and E. Witchel, “Ryoan: A distributed
sandbox for untrusted computation on secret data.,” in OSDI, pp. 533–
549, 2016.
[38] L. Rainie and M. Duggan, “Privacy and information sharing,” Pew
Research Center, vol. 16, 2016.
[39] J. Van Bulck, F. Piessens, and R. Strackx, “Foreshadow: Extracting the
keys to the intel {SGX} kingdom with transient out-of-order execution,”
in 27th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 2018.
[40] W. Wang, G. Chen, X. Pan, Y. Zhang, X. Wang, V. Bindschaedler,
H. Tang, and C. A. Gunter, “Leaky cauldron on the dark land: Un-
derstanding memory side-channel hazards in sgx,” in Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pp. 2421–2434, ACM, 2017.
[41] N. Zhang, H. Sun, K. Sun, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Cachekit: Evading
memory introspection using cache incoherence,” in 2016 IEEE European
Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), pp. 337–352, IEEE,
2016.
[42] N. Zhang, K. Sun, D. Shands, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Trusense:
Information leakage from trustzone,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2018-IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications, pp. 1097–1105, IEEE, 2018.
[43] J. Van Bulck, N. Weichbrodt, R. Kapitza, F. Piessens, and R. Strackx,
“Telling your secrets without page faults: Stealthy page table-based
attacks on enclaved execution,” in 26th {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 17), pp. 1041–1056, 2017.
[44] Y. Xu, W. Cui, and M. Peinado, “Controlled-channel attacks: Deter-
ministic side channels for untrusted operating systems,” in 2015 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 640–656, IEEE, 2015.
[45] N. Zhang, K. Sun, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Case: Cache-assisted secure
execution on arm processors,” in 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), pp. 72–90, IEEE, 2016.
[46] V. Buterin, “Privacy on blockchain.” https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/
15/privacy-on-the-blockchain/.
[47] “Smart business retail — visa.” https://usa.visa.com/run-your-business/
small-business-tools/retail.html.
[48] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. Van Renesse, “Bitcoin-ng: A
scalable blockchain protocol.,” in NSDI, pp. 45–59, 2016.
[49] J. Poon and T. Dryja, “The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-chain
instant payments,” Technical Report (draft), 2015.
[50] E. K. Kogias, P. Jovanovic, N. Gailly, I. Khoffi, L. Gasser, and B. Ford,
“Enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency
via collective signing,” in 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 16), pp. 279–296, USENIX Association, 2016.
[51] “Raiden network.” https://https://raiden.network/.
[52] “Rinkeby: Ethereum testnet.” https://www.rinkeby.io/.
[53] Intel, “Intel software guard extensions (intel sgx) sdk for linux os -
developer reference,” 2018.
[54] D. Dheeru and E. Karra Taniskidou, “UCI machine learning repository,”
2017.
[55] L. Luu, D.-H. Chu, H. Olickel, P. Saxena, and A. Hobor, “Making smart
contracts smarter,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 254–269, ACM, 2016.
[56] F. Schuster, M. Costa, C. Fournet, C. Gkantsidis, M. Peinado, G. Mainar-
Ruiz, and M. Russinovich, “Vc3: Trustworthy data analytics in the cloud
using sgx,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 IEEE Symposium on,
pp. 38–54, IEEE, 2015.
[57] O. Ohrimenko, F. Schuster, C. Fournet, A. Mehta, S. Nowozin,
K. Vaswani, and M. Costa, “Oblivious multi-party machine learning
on trusted processors.,” in USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 619–636,
2016.
[58] N. Cao, C. Wang, M. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-preserving multi-
keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions
on parallel and distributed systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 222–233, 2014.
[59] V. S. Verykios, E. Bertino, I. N. Fovino, L. P. Provenza, Y. Saygin,
and Y. Theodoridis, “State-of-the-art in privacy preserving data mining,”
ACM Sigmod Record, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 50–57, 2004.
[60] N. Zhang, J. Li, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Privacyguard: Enforcing private
data usage with blockchain and attested execution,” in Data Privacy
Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology, pp. 345–
353, Springer, 2018.
[61] R. Pass, E. Shi, and F. Tramer, “Formal abstractions for attested
execution secure processors,” in Annual International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 260–289,
Springer, 2017.
[62] W. Zheng, A. Dave, J. G. Beekman, R. A. Popa, J. E. Gonzalez, and
I. Stoica, “Opaque: An oblivious and encrypted distributed analytics
platform,” in 14th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation (NSDI 17), (Boston, MA), pp. 283–298, USENIX
Association, 2017.
[63] T. Hunt, C. Song, R. Shokri, V. Shmatikov, and E. Witchel, “Chi-
ron: Privacy-preserving machine learning as a service,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.05961, 2018.
[64] B. A. Fisch, D. Vinayagamurthy, D. Boneh, and S. Gorbunov, “Iron:
Functional encryption using intel sgx,” 2017.
[65] A. R. Choudhuri, M. Green, A. Jain, G. Kaptchuk, and I. Miers,
“Fairness in an unfair world: Fair multiparty computation from public
bulletin boards,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 719–728, ACM, 2017.
[66] L. Luu, J. Teutsch, R. Kulkarni, and P. Saxena, “Demystifying incentives
in the consensus computer,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 706–719,
ACM, 2015.
[67] J. Teutsch and C. Reitwießner, “A scalable verification solution for
blockchains,” 2017.
[68] R. Kumaresan and I. Bentov, “Amortizing secure computation with
penalties,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pp. 418–429, ACM, 2016.
[69] R. Kumaresan, T. Moran, and I. Bentov, “How to use bitcoin to
play decentralized poker,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 195–206,
ACM, 2015.
[70] M. Andrychowicz, S. Dziembowski, D. Malinowski, and L. Mazurek,
“Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin,” in Security and Privacy
(SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on, pp. 443–458, IEEE, 2014.
[71] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, et al., “Decentralizing privacy: Using blockchain
to protect personal data,” in Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW),
2015 IEEE, pp. 180–184, IEEE, 2015.
[72] A. Azaria, A. Ekblaw, T. Vieira, and A. Lippman, “Medrec: Using
blockchain for medical data access and permission management,” in
Open and Big Data (OBD), International Conference on, pp. 25–30,
IEEE, 2016.
[73] I. Bentov, Y. Ji, F. Zhang, Y. Li, X. Zhao, L. Breidenbach, P. Daian, and
A. Juels, “Tesseract: Real-time cryptocurrency exchange using trusted
hardware.,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2017, p. 1153, 2017.
[74] F. Tramer, F. Zhang, H. Lin, J.-P. Hubaux, A. Juels, and E. Shi, “Sealed-
glass proofs: Using transparent enclaves to prove and sell knowledge,” in
2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P),
pp. 19–34, IEEE, 2017.
[75] G. Kaptchuk, I. Miers, and M. Green, “Giving state to the stateless:
Augmenting trustworthy computation with ledgers,” tech. rep.
[76] “The confidential consortium blockchain framework.”
https://github.com/Azure/coco-framework/blob/master/docs/Coco%
20Framework%20whitepaper.pdf.
